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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is proper according to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err when it held that Salt Lake City Police Officer Hudson did 
not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant, Tim Bench, was driving 
under the influence of alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502, on April 12th, 
2005 in Salt Lake City? 
Although the Court of Appeals gives some "measure of discretion" to the trial 
court's application of those facts to the law, whether or not there is reasonable articulable 
suspicion for a stop is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Preece, 
971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Furthermore, when reviewing courts have enough 
experience with recurring fact patterns the court may limit the trial court's discretion. 
State v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
The issues presented for review were preserved by oral argument to the trial court 
as shown by the transcript of the motion hearing. (R. 130, Addendum A, p. 22). 
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DETERM1JNA i IV U < '< »N'N I I il I I if IN \ I, I HON INK )NS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Hie United States Constitution and Utah State Constitution govern this case. 
The Fourth amendment to - i •u wd States Coi istiti itioi 1 states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
!ide I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution States: 
rhe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated: linl 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the n, r ;on 
or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77 7- I:: is the determinative statute at issue in this case. The \-\\ of 
the statute is listed below in its entirety. 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question > .. \; \- . -
Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
On April 12th, 2005, Officer Justin Hudson of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department was on duty patrolling in the Glendale area of Salt Lake City when he heard a 
radio broadcast about a man who had been transporting children in the Rose Park area 
while intoxicated. (R. 130, Addendum A, pp. 10-11). The radio broadcast indicated that 
an ex-wife of a man called in to report that her ex-husband had just dropped of their 
children and left in his truck and that he was intoxicated. {Id. at pp. 14-15.) The 
broadcast also gave the name of the driver, the vehicle description, a possible destination 
address, and the license plate number. (Id. at pp. 11, 15.) 
Although Officer Hudson was not dispatched to the call, he saw a truck matching 
the description of the truck given in the radio dispatch, which he recalled was a red 
Dodge truck. {Id. at pp. 12, 13.) Officer Hudson saw the truck going eastbound in the 
vicinity of Navajo and California in Salt Lake City and did a U-turn and began to follow 
the truck. (Id.) Officer Hudson confirmed that the license plate matched the license given 
in the dispatch and continued to follow the truck.(M) Officer Hudson observed that the 
driver of the truck slowed the truck down and began driving about 10 miles per hour 
under the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. {Id.) Additionally he noted that the 
driver signaled for a "great deal of time", about "5 seconds or so" before making a lane 
change. (Id.) Officer Hudson stopped the truck at about California and Emery in Salt 
Lake City after following it for approximately 2 blocks. {Id. at p. 19) 
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Officer Hudson testified that although he might have stopped the truck just on the 
dispatch information alone, he believed the truck was driven in a cautious and suspicious 
manner which gave him further justification to stop the truck. (Id. at pp. 18-19.) Officer 
Hudson testified that based on his training and experience, the fact that the truck was 
being driven slowly is a potential indicator of alcohol impairment. (Id. at p. 13.) 
Additionally, Officer Hudson testified that signaling a lane change for an excessive 
amount of time when being followed by a police officer is a suspicious driving pattern 
that indicates that "something's going on" and the driver doesn't want to be stopped. (Id. 
at p. 14.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Officer Hudson's traffic stop of Mr. Bench's car was supported by a reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The information provided by the dispatch radio 
broadcast about an intoxicated driver and the Officer's own observations corroborating 
the broadcast were sufficient to give him reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Bench 
was operating his vehicle while impaired. Additionally, due to the extreme danger posed 
by impaired drivers, public safety concerns justify Officer Hudson's stop of the car 
because the assurance of public safety by removing impaired drivers from the road 
substantially outweighs the minimal intrusion into Mr. Bench's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT OFFICER HUDSON DID NOT 
HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP MR. 
BENCH WAS AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF LAW. 
The testimony given by Officer Hudson demonstrates that under the totality of the 
circumstances, reasonable suspicion existed for his stop of Mr. Bench. The Fourth 
Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 9 (1968)(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (I960)). The first issue 
that must be decided is whether the peace officer's action was "justified at its inception." 
Id. at 19-20. "A stop is constitutionally justified if the officer has reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the defendant has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994)." 
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). 
In determining the reasonableness of an officer's stop, there is no bright-line test. 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Reasonable suspicion is 
determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Id. 
Utah case law has applied a three-step analysis in addressing vehicle stops similar 
to the stop in this case. The factors balanced in this analysis are as follows: (1) whether or 
not the informant identifies himself or herself; (2) what details are provided; and (3) 
"whether the investigating officer is able to verify the information provided by the 
informant." Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also, City 
8 
of St George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Note that the last prong 
of this analysis "does not require the officer to observe the reported behavior, e.g., 
indications of driving drunk in Mulcahy; it is enough that the officer verified the car's 
description and location within a few minutes of the report." Id 
In discussing the reliability of a citizen informant who actually identifies 
themselves, the Court stated, 
[A]n identified "citizen-informant" is high on the reliability scale. The 
ordinary citizen informant needs no "independent proof of reliability or 
veracity." . . . We simply assume veracity when a citizen-informant 
provides information as a victim or witness of crime. "This is because 
citizen informers, unlike police informers, volunteer information out of 
concern for the community and not for personal benefit." Further weighing 
in favor of the reliability and veracity of a named citizen-informant is that 
"the informant is exposed to possible criminal and civil prosecution if the 
report is false." And, by providing his or her name a citizen-informant 
"makes it possible for the police to verify the facts underlying the report." 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234; see also, State v. James, 13 P.3d 576, fn 5 (Utah 2000); City of 
St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 (Utah App. 1987); State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 
2000). Like the Mulcahy case, the citizen-informant in this case was identified. Officer 
Hudson knew from the dispatched radio broadcast that she was the ex-wife of the 
suspected intoxicated driver and that she was the mother of the children the driver had 
just dropped off. Similar to the Mulcahy, the reliability of the informant in this case is 
high on the reliability scale because the identified informant is exposed to potential 
criminal prosecution and for that reason is likely to give truthful information to police. 
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The second prong to determine reliability of the citizen informant is whether there 
are details given in the report. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234. In Mulcahy, the informant told 
police that a "drunk individual" was "in a white car - - possibly a Toyota," (The make of 
the car provided by the informant was incorrect as the Defendant was driving a white 
Mazda.) and was moving in the direction of a certain road. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237. In 
this case there were many more details provided than were given in Mulcahy. For 
example, the police dispatch provided the name of the defendant, the fact that he had just 
dropped off his children at his ex-wife's house in Rose Park, the statement that he was 
intoxicated, the color and make of the truck he was driving, a possible destination 
address, and a license plate number. These additional details go above and beyond the 
sparse details that were ultimately deemed sufficient to find the police had reasonable 
suspicion to make a stop in the Mulcahy case. The facts and details in this case were 
therefore also sufficient to give Officer Hudson reasonable articulable suspicion to stop 
the vehicle. 
The third prong to look at is whether the details are verified by the police officer. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234. In Mulcahy those details were verified by an officer in the 
vicinity who saw a white car on the road reported by the informant and the make of the 
car (Mazda) was similar to the description (Toyota). Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 238. The 
officer did not see and the Court did not require, any evidence that the driver was driving 
while impaired. Id. In this case, once again, there is much more corroboration of the 
details than was provided in Mulcahy. Officer Hudson saw a truck matching the 
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description of the truck provided by dispatch. Additionally he confirmed that the license 
plate of the truck he saw was the same as provided by dispatch. Finally, Officer Hudson 
personally observed a driving pattern that was consistent with impaired driving and that 
he considered to be suspicious. Officer Hudson testified that he saw the car driving about 
10 miles per hour under the speed limit and signaled for a very long period of time before 
making a lane change. Because Officer Hudson's corroboration of the details in the 
dispatch report exceed the corroboration which was present in Mulcahy, there was 
sufficient reliability in the dispatch report to support reasonable suspicion to make the 
stop. 
Finally, Officer Hudson's actions are justified due to concerns of public safety. 
When officers receive a report of an intoxicated driver, public safety requires officers to 
conduct the minimally intrusive investigation of an investigatory stop. It is not acceptable 
to expect an investigating officer "to wait until [suspects] put himself and the general 
public in danger." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. Due to the grave danger posed by 
intoxicated drivers, public safety concerns mandate a brief, minimal intrusion into one 
person's privacy when there is a report of an identifiable intoxicated driver and the police 
are able to locate that individual. In fact, compared to the great risk to life and property 
posed by a drunk driver, a short investigatory detention is a nominal intrusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Officer Hudson had the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion to make a 
traffic stop of Mr. Bench's car when he stopped him based on a police dispatch indicating 
a precise description of a truck driven by an intoxicated man who had just dropped off his 
children at his ex-wife's house. Not only did the information come from an identified 
informant and give sufficient detail, but Officer Hudson personally confirmed the details 
provided and personally observed suspicious driving that was indicative of potential 
impairment. Therefore the decision of the trial court suppressing evidence and dismissing 
the case should be reversed and the case should be reinstated and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / ^ d a y of Jg/lKctr*!/ , 2007 
ION FLATER 
BERNADETTE M. GOMEZ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' I hcivby OTlifv tin' ^n Mir ) ltd <l\\ ot JaniKirv, 20ny? I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief to: 
Jason Schatz 
Attorney for Defendant 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake Cii 1 
/^5 
13 
ADENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TIM KELLY BENCH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 055900194 
Motion Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
June 20, 2006 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE PAUL MAUGHAN 
Third District Court Judge 
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For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
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Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)535-7767 
Jason A. Schatz 
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Provo, Utah 84606 
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( E l e c t r o n i c a l l y r e c o r d e d on June 20, 2006) 
- 3 -
THE COURT: Okay, we're here on Salt Lake City vs. Tim 
Bench. It's set for a motion to suppress. 
MS. GOMEZ: 'Yen ir Hoi ic: :i , may I approach with the motion 
to strike? 
THE COURT: Sure. lit , TV-hat", l n ^ you seen this? 
MR. SCHATZ: I was just provided with a copy when I 
walked in, your Honor. 
MS. GOMEZ: I faxed it to his officer earlier this 
afternoon, your Honor. 
MR, SCHATZ; [ haven't befii dl my office since about 11 
o'clock this morning. So I probably (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, I understand. 
(Counsel reviewing document. 
THE COURT: Do you have a response? 
MR. SCHATZ: Well, your Honor, my response would be I 
don't know why it's taken them so long to file this motion, the 
day of the motion hearing. This isn't the first time it's been 
set. We've continued it once previously, and whoever handled 
this case before never filed an objection. 
I think in this case there are certain facts that I 
think are in dispute; and I think in particular, with regard 
for the reason for the stop, I'm curious to know exactly what 
the officer knew before he initiated the traffic stop, because 
- 4 -
1 according to the reports, the only thing he indicated is he had 
2 received a report from dispatch about a male who his ex-wife 
3 had indicated dropped his children off and was intoxicated. 
4 Then the only other reason he indicates for stopping 
5 the vehicle is he says he turned to catch up to the vehicle. 
6 The vehicle hit its brakes and began to drive slow. Then he 
7 used his turn signal for approximately five seconds before 
8 changing lanes. 
9 I don't see how that driving pattern in and of itself 
10 would give the officer reasonable suspicion to stop. So we 
11 need to have this hearing so that the officer can stand and 
12 tell us exactly what information he knew prior to initiating 
13 that traffic stop. That's not something I can determine based 
14 on his police report alone. 
15 There are other factual issues. I have requested, and 
16 I did a supplemental request asking — apparently there was 
17 multiple attempts at the breath test in this case, and there 
18 was actually multiple cards issued. I've only been provided 
19 with one card; and back in October of 2005 I specifically filed 
20 a supplemental request for discovery asking for copies of all 
21 of those cards. 
22 In speaking with the officer here today, he says 
23 there was multiple cards booked into evidence; and I think 
24 that those multiple cards are critical to my case, because I'm 
25 certain -- although that the one card that we do have is an 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
In 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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insufficient sample, part of the State's argument is that he 
refused to submit or refused to give a full sample. 
I've had instances where codes have been given on a 
breath testing device that were not consistent with refusal to 
give a sample, but for other reasons. I think I'm entitled to 
look at those cards if they were in fact kept to determine — 
THE COURT: Yeal i bi it that's r lot an issue of 
suppression, is it? 
MR. SCHATZ: Well, if we could — 
THE COURT: I mean, that's a matter of discovery, isn't 
it? 
MR. SCHATZ: Well, I would — the only way I could 
find out, I guess, is I made a supplemental request. I got no 
response for over six months, and having a hearing aiid asking 
the officer who did the test, where they — what happened to 
them, what they were, is the only way for me to discover what 
that information really was. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can go forward on your first 
otion under probable cause to stop, whether there was or 
wasn't. 
sobriety 
properly 
I'm not 
tests. 
That' 
I mean, you can 
followed (inaudi 
. part 
They 
s goi 
point 
.ble) 
MR. SCHATZ: 
icularly concerned about the field 
were either conducted or they weren 
ng to be a matter for jury, 
out whether 
or not. So 
Your Honor, 
— whether you 
— 
our position on 
anyway. 
think th( 
that is i 
' t 
So, 
sy 
::he 
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1 Court has to make a determination. Just because someone was 
2 stopped and they may have been drinking, that in and of itself 
3 was not probable cause to arrest. I think the officer's 
4 decision to arrest is based in great part on the field sobriety 
5 test. If he didn't do them properly --
6 THE COURT: Well, then you're going to ask me to 
7 substitute my judgment for that of a jury. As long as there's 
8 something close to it — I mean, I'll treat that just like I 
9 will a preliminary hearing. If they can meet the preliminary 
10 hearing, probable cause, it's in. 
11 MR. SCHATZ: Well, and my point is that the officer 
12 — you can walk up to your — to anybody on the street and 
13 wave your finger back and forth, and that gives you no valid 
14 indication of whether or not they're impaired. So if the 
15 officer didn't do the field sobriety tests properly, not only 
16 should the Court not consider it for probable cause purposes, 
17 they should not be submitted to the jury because then they 
18 become more prejudicial and probative. If they're not 
19 reliable, they serve no real purpose. 
20 THE COURT: Well, that's what you can argue, whether 
21 it's reliable or not, but I'm not going to — I mean, I've seen 
22 the horizontal gaze nystagmus, where they take it seems like 
23 five minutes to get there or they whip it across. That's for 
24 you to establish. I'm not — I don't know any more about it 
25 than the officer; or less — I know less about it, though I've 
seen 
the 
the 
jury 
So i 
it and heard it enough. 
My point is, if there/ 
one that' 
rules anc 
's going 
f that's 
it was a half 
is --
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
examining the 
THE 
s anywhere 
s going to determine whether 
i regulations. If 
to weigh that. I' 
— if you're just 
a second instead 
SCHATZ: Well, the 
COURT: — I'm not 
SCHATZ: -- without 
officer. I have 
COURT: And if that 
it's close, 
m just tell 
concerned b 
near --
or not 
- if — I'm 
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not 
they followed 
it's in; and the 
ing you that now. 
ecause it was a --
of two seconds, or whatever it 
fact is I h 
(inaudible) 
having a h 
no idea if 
's all you' 
ave no idea --
with it. 
earing 
he did 
and cross 
it once or 
re hoping to find 
— 
it, then you're not entitled to a motion to suppress, unless 
you've got something that meets — I realize that the motion 
is late to strike this, but unless you have something that is 
materially in dispute, you're not entitled to a hearing just to 
fish for it. 
MR. SCHATZ: Well, I don't see how any other way we're 
ever going to be able to uncover that prior to an actual jury 
".rial. There was no driver's license hearing where we normally 
can ferret some of those things out. 
THE COURT: I don't know. You're stuck with what you 
have. 
MR. SCHATZ: So are we proceeding, then — 
1 THE COURT: On the probable cause for stop. 
2 MR. SCHATZ: — on the reasonable suspicion? 
3 THE COURT: That's correct. 
4 MR. SCHATZ: And then what about the breath test? I 
5 mean, can I at least ask the officer some questions so I can 
6 figure out — I guess if they're not — they don't have the 
7 breath testing printout cards, we may have a motion to repress 
8 the refusal — 
9 THE COURT: That's fine, but that's — do you have 
10 those cards? 
11 MS. GOMEZ: Your Honor, I don't see why we need to have 
12 a hearing on it. The officer is here, and he told defense 
13 Counsel that those are in evidence. That there is two cards; 
14 and I told defense Counsel that I will get those for him. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. That's all we need 
16 today, then. 
17 MR. SCHATZ: So are we saying — stating on the record 
18 that there are in fact multiple cards? 
19 MS. GOMEZ: According to the officer, we can state on 
20 the record that according to the officer there were --
21 MR. SCHATZ: Two or three. 
22 MS. GOMEZ: — two or three cards booked into evidence. 
23 I don't know whether that means that they are actually there 
24 in evidence, but he's saying they were booked into evidence. 
25 However, your Honor, I don't see how that's even relevant, 
-9 
1 because we weren't planning to admit them anyway. So I'm not 
2 sure what the relevance is. 
3 THE COURT: Well, that's for Mr. Schatz to decide with 
4 this case. 
5 MR. SCHATZ: And I'm fine with that, if he's admitting 
6 that there were multiple cards. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to call your officer, 
8 then. We'll talk about the probable cause to stop. 
9 MS. GOMEZ: I will. State calls Officer Hudson. 
10 COURT CLERK: Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, 
11 the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
12 THE WITNESS: I do. 
13 THE COURT: Come and take the stand, please. 
14 You may proceed. 
15 JUSTIN HUDSON, 
16 having been first duly sworn, 
17 testified as follows: 
18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MS. GOMEZ: 
20 Q. Officer Hudson, will you please state and spell your 
21 name for the record. 
22 A. Officer Justin Hudson. 
23 Q. And where do you work? 
24 A. What's that? 
25 Q. Where do you work? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Police 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Did you 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
impaire 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
without 
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Salt Lake City Police Department. 
And how long have you worked with the Salt Lake City 
Department? 
Six years. A little over six years. 
Now, were you on duty on April 12th, 2005? 
I was . 
I'm going to go back to ask you a few more questions. 
attend the training academy? 
I did. 
And what was that? 
The Utah POST Academy. 
And at that academy were you trained on detecting 
d drivers? 
We were. 
What type of training was that? 
They actually brought in people, volunteers, who 
our knowledge drank different amounts of alcohol; and 
then they brought them in for us to test each one of them, and 
try to determine what type of alcohol content they had in their 
body before the breath tests. 
Q. 
trained 
driving 
A. 
Q. 
Now, besides that alcohol workshop, were you also 
to detect impaired drivers by certain patterns of 
? 
Yes. 
And what type of driving patterns would you see in 
- 1 1 -
impaired driving? 
A. Simple patterns such as not obeying traffic laws. 
Other patterns such as slow driving, just curious /driving when 
an officer is behind them, things of that nature. 
Q. Okay, you said you were on duty on April 12th, 2005. 
A Yes. 
Q. And at around 10 p.m. did you conduct a stop? 
A. I conducted a stop at 9:42 p.m., yes. 
Q. And where did you conduct the stop? 
A. I was in the Glendale area, and I overheard a call on 
the radio in the Rose Park area regarding a male that had just 
— was transporting children while intoxicated. That was the 
report that dispatch gave us. I wasn't on the call. I was 
just patrolling a different area, and they — on the radio they 
gave us the address where he might be going; and I happened to 
see him driving. 
Q. Was there anything else in the report? I mean, did 
they -- you overheard (inaudible) that there was an intoxicated 
person with children in the car? 
A. They just — I got — they gave us that initial 
information. They gave us the vehicle description^ the 
person's naj^^iJoiii^s^^like t.tiat^  and then tliey also said that 
he'd already been there and left. That's basically this --
over a year later, that's all I can remember. 
Q. And do you recall if there was a car that they talked 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
about? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
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There was__a~x&dLtruck/ I believe, a Dodge. 
And were there any other details about the vehicle? 
I can't recall any others. 
Did 
traveling? 
A. 
suppose 
call. 
the off 
No, 
they tell you the location the vehicle would be 
no. They just gave the location that he had 
dly lived; and like I said, I wasn't dispatched to the 
I was 
MR. 
just patrolling a different area of town. 
SCHATZ: Your Honor, I'm sorry, but could we ask 
icer to set his report aside unless he's using it, 
specifically 
testify 
refresh 
THE 
being asked to refresh his memory from it? 
COURT: Sure. Officer Hudson, you're -- you can 
as to what you remember. If you need the report to 
your recollection you can use it, but you're not to 
just read from or testify from it. 
Q. 
can you 
A. 
where I 
Q. 
A. 
He was 
THE 
MR. 
WITNESS: Okay. 
SCHATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
BY MS. GOMEZ: Now, with that information that you had, 
tell us where you were at when you conducted the stop? 
I conducted the stop on Emery Street. That's not 
came 
And 
in contact with him. 
where did you come in contact with him? 
Approximately I think it was Navajo and California. 
going eastbound. I was going westbound when I saw him. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Is that Salt Lake City jurisdiction? 
Yes, it is. 
Okay, go ahead and describe — 
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I was just traveling. I wasn't necessarily looking 
for him, but as I was traveling westbound I saw a 
matching the description. So I did a U-turn and 
follow 
truck. 
in the 
the truck and saw the license plate and it 
When I turned around and began to follow, 
vehicle slowed down about 10 miles an hour 
speed limit. Then signaled for a great deal of t 
five seconds or so. Then changed lanes and conti 
slow, between 20, 25 miles an hour. That's when 
attempted the stop them, to California and Emery. 
Q. 
as the 
A. 
Q. 
Okay, I want to ask you a question about 
truck 
began to 
was 
the 
that 
person 
under the 
ime, 
nued 
about 
going 
I tried to --
that. As far 
25 mile an hour, what is the speed limit on that road? 
It's 35. 
And is slow driving, is that an indicato 
impairment in your training and experience? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
r of 
And you also mentioned about the five second 
Is that an excessively long time for a signal? 
A. 
that's 
Q. 
A. 
Generally we don't see a signal at all, 
a very long time. 
Would that indicate alcoholic impairment 
alcohol 
signal. 
but yeah, 
9 
Well, not necessarily, but what it indicates to me 
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1 is they know they're being followed and they want to make sure 
2 that I don't pull them over. I think that's usually the way I 
3 look at it. I'd been on patrol -- at that point I'd been on 
4 patrol four-and-a-half years, and when I see somebody driving 
5 that carefully, and I'm already paying attention to them for 
6 an obvious reason, then that definitely indicates to me that 
7 something's going on. That they know I'm there and that they 
8 don't want me to stop them. 
9 Q. Okay, and based on what you observed, coupled with 
10 what you overheard on the radio, did you feel that the 
11 defendant was impaired? 
12 A. Yeah, I did. I mean, it's suspicious enough to begin 
13 with to have somebody be driving that slow and signaling for 
14 that long, in my mind, just because I'm following them. Then 
15 coupled with the fact of what I heard over the radio, I assumed 
16 he was impaired, yes. 
17 MS. GOMEZ: Thank you, Officer. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Schatz. 
19 CROSS EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. SCHATZ: 
21 Q. So you're just out driving around and hear this call 
22 come over the radio of dispatch saying that there was a male 
23 driver who — did you have any details; did you get any 
24 information about who made the complaint initially? 
25 A. Yeah, it was — I heard on the radio that dispatch did 
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say that it was the ex-wife or wife calling; and she lived in 
Rose Park. I don't remember the address. 
Q. And did you receive any information that the two of 
them had been involved in sort of an ongoing custody dispute? 
A. I don't recall that in the report, but it could have 
been. Like I said, it wasn't really my call. It was just — I 
just overheard it. 
Q. And you said that from what you recall, there was the 
description of the vehicle as a red truck, but you weren't sure 
what the make was? 
A. I'm sure at the time I knew what the make was, because 
they had the plate and everything. They always put the plate 
and everything on the log, but at that time — now I can't 
remember exactly what the plate or anything was, no. 
Q. Okay. Did you get any information about why this 
individual felt that — had reason to believe that he was 
intoxicated? Did they say that he stumbled and fell down the 
steps when he dropped the kids off? Was there any detail about 
why that individual was believed to be intoxicated? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. All you know is that his ex-wife had called in a 
report and said that he had dropped off the kids and she 
thought he might be intoxicated? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And how long did you — you said you finally made 
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1 contact with him at about Navajo Street and California? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. And then at that point you turned around to follow 
4 him? 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. And that's when you observed him -- two things. One 
7 is you said he was driving too slowly. Was he interfering with 
8 any traffic? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Was there people backed up behind him honking their 
11 horn or anything? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Are you required to drive the speed limit? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Is it illegal not to drive the speed limit? 
16 A. It can be, yes. 
17 Q. It's illegal to go over the speed limit, right? 
18 A. Right. 
19 Q. But it's not illegal to go under the speed limit 
20 unless you're interfering with other traffic, correct? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. So he wasn't committing any sort of traffic violation 
23 by going 25 miles an hour in a 35 mile an hour zone? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. All right, but that was still suspicious to you? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. All right, and you said that he signaled for five 
3 seconds when changing lanes? 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. According to Utah code how long does a driver have to 
6 signal when making a lane change? 
7 A. Three seconds. 
8 Q. A minimum of three seconds, correct? 
9 A. Uh-huh. 
10 Q. Doesn't say you can't signal for longer than that, 
11 does it? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. And in fact, have you ever pulled somebody over for 
14 not signaling for three seconds? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. How often? 
17 A. Not very often. Just if they're impeding traffic or 
18 about to cause an accident or something like that. 
19 Q. So if he wouldn't have signaled you would have pulled 
20 him over, right? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. Okay, because that's a traffic violation; and you're 
23 saying the difference between three seconds and five seconds, 
24 when the statute says a minimum of three seconds, you said that 
25 extra two seconds is an excessively long period of time. 
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1 A. In my mind, yes. 
2 Q. I mean, how long does the average person signal in a 
3 lane change? 
4 A. About one second. 
5 Q. All right, but that would be illegal, then, right? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. And that would give you grounds to stop him? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. So in other words, he didn't violate the lane change 
10 statute, did he? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. So your reason for stopping him was based 
13 solely on this sort of undetailed report from an ex-wife, who 
14 for all you know, hated her husband's — ex-husband's guts and 
15 just wanted to try and get him in trouble? 
16 A. That's not the only reason I stopped him, no. I would 
17 have stopped him anyway, probably. 
18 Q. So if you would have observed him driving -- say if 
19 he'd have been driving 30 miles an hour instead of 25, and he'd 
20 only signaled for three seconds instead of five, would you 
21 still have pulled him over? 
22 A. I can't — I don't know. I don't know. That's not 
23 what happened. So I don't know. 
24 Q. All right. Well, hypothetically, I mean, if that's 
25 what you observed, would you have still pulled him over? 
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1 A. I can't really say. I don't know. You have to — 
2 every time, everything out there is different every time, so --
3 Q. Well, on this particular occasion -- let me ask you 
4 this. Did you take into account those two things as part of 
5 your reason for stopping? 
6 A. Yes. Oh, yes. 
7 Q. Okay, but absent those two things, you don't know if 
8 you'd have pulled him over or not, just based on that report 
9 you heard over dispatch? 
10 A. I might have pulled him over, just from the suspicion 
11 that he was intoxicated, because of the — what we had over the 
12 radio. I might have stopped him anyway, yes. 
13 Q. Now, when you stopped him — how long had you followed 
14 him between when you first laid eyes on him until you finally 
15 turned your overhead lights on? 
16 A. It was two blocks. I turned my overhead lights on as 
17 we were turning southbound onto Emery. 
18 Q. All right, and during that two-block period did you 
19 observe him commit any illegal traffic violations at all? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Did you observe any equipment violations? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Okay, so he wasn ' t weaving? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. This was — was this in the middle of the afternoon? 
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1 A. It was evening. 
2 Q. Evening? 
3 A. Yeah. 
4 Q. Okay. So he wasn't weaving. He wasn't speeding. He 
5 didn't run any stop signs? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. He signaled all of his lane changes and turns? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. He didn't go into other lanes or anything like that? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Okay. So there was nothing about his driving pattern 
12 that violated any sort of traffic laws? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. And they were not typical of what you would think of 
15 an intoxicated driver, were they? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay, just because someone has been driving the speed 
18 limit? 
19 A. When somebody slows down when I get them behind them, 
20 and starts driving like that, yes, that usually is suspicious 
21 to me. 
22 Q. Do you find that when you're driving your vehicle, 
23 that the people around you tend to be more cautious when they 
24 know a police officer is following them? 
25 A. Cautious, yes. 
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1 Q. Okay. Nobody wants to get a ticket, do they? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. I mean — 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Do you find yourself driving maybe a little under the 
6 speed limit when there's another officer around? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. I guess maybe you don't have that feeling. 
9 A. No, I don't get that feeling. 
10 Q. Do you think people do that — 
11 A. Sure. 
12 Q. — when they see other officers? 
13 A. (No verbal response). 
14 Q. So why would it be so abnormal when he saw you 
15 following him, to make sure he wasn't exceeding the speed 
16 limit? Isn't that what a driver is supposed to do? 
17 A. Most people will slow down to about the speed limit. 
18 They don't slow down ten miles an hour under the speed limit. 
19 Q. Okay, but you had no idea, I mean, exactly why he 
20 slowed down, did you? 
21 A. I had no idea, no. That's what's suspicious about it. 
22 MR. SCHATZ: I have nothing further. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Gomez. 
24 MS. GOMEZ: I have nothing else for the officer. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
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1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Anything further? 
3 MS. GOMEZ: Your Honor, it seems clear here that there 
4 was reasonable suspicion to stop based on the totality of the 
5 circumstances. The officer had information from the dispatch 
6 that there was a drunk driver. I think that the case law 
7 clearly establishes even if the person hadn't known the person 
8 in the car, that once the officer comes and he is able to match 
9 the description of what the person called in, that that in 
10 itself is reasonable suspicion for the stop. 
11 Here the information he had that this was someone that 
12 knew the defendant. She had called and said that the person 
13 was drunk driving. Then when he sees the description matching 
14 the vehicle that was reported from the dispatch, he flips 
15 around in a U-turn and follows the vehicle. Then at that 
16 time he notices that the vehicle slows way down, ten miles an 
17 hour under the speed limit, and he also notices that he left 
18 his signal on for a long period of time. I think that those 
19 facts provide the officer with reasonable suspicion for the 
20 stop. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Schatz. 
22 MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, what we have here is a 
23 completely undetailed sort of a blank, "Well, my husband 
24 dropped the kids off and he's intoxicated." The information — 
25 what is critical is the information that the officer had at the 
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time, he made the decision and what he based his decision on. 
In this case all he's got is a report coming over 
dispatch from the alleged driver, the defendant's ex-wife. He 
doesn't have any information why she had reason to believe he 
was impaired. There was no detail given as to why she had any 
reason to think he had even been drinking. There's just this 
sort of blanket sort of vague argument, I guess, or complaint 
made that he was intoxicated. 
You know, for all the officer knew, they had just 
gotten in an argument over visitation, and she was just trying 
to do something to bother him or inconvenience him. So there 
was nothing behind that complaint that would have really given 
the officer good reason to believe he was impaired. 
Then when he pulled behind him, he observes what he 
thinks is the truck, and he says he verified it at the time 
with the license plate; but when asked specifically if he 
would have pulled the vehicle over absent these two suspicious 
driving patterns that he seems to indicate, he can't give us 
a definite answer. I think it's because the answer was he 
didn't think he had reason to pull them over just based on that 
dispatch alone. 
If we look at that those two added factors, I think 
they're irrelevant. Driving 25 miles an hour in a 35 mile 
an hour zone, there is absolutely nothing illegal about that 
whatsoever. I bet you if we went out on the road, there's a 
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1 lot of people who don't drive the full speed limit. Heck, if 
2 he'd have been going a mile over, he'd have been violating the 
3 law. So just because he was driving slow, that is not a crime. 
4 That is not reasonable suspicion. 
5 It's only a crime if he's impeding traffic; and as 
6 the officer indicated, he wasn't blocking any traffic. There 
7 weren't cars backed up behind him. So that in and of itself is 
8 no reason to stop; and I don't think it necessarily adds that 
9 much to the first complaint. 
10 Second of all, for him to say that signaling for 
11 five seconds is an unusually long time I think is absolutely 
12 ridiculous. The statute says you have to signal for a minimum 
13 of three seconds. If I had a nickel for every time I had a 
14 client pulled over and arrested for DUI because he didn't 
15 signal for at least three seconds, I probably wouldn't have 
16 to be here today. He's saying that it was abnormal that he 
17 signaled for three seconds versus five. 
18 It's obvious that the officer was looking for any 
19 additional excuse to try to pull him over, and he latched onto 
20 these two things, which I don't think gives him any additional 
21 reason to pull him over, over and above what he had already 
22 had, which still didn't give him reasonable suspicion based 
23 on this alleged complaint that, you know, he didn't have any 
2 4 detail about. It was a very vague report at that point. 
25 Certainly these two driving patterns he claims are 
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indicative of people who are impaired, I would refer the Court 
to other sort of driving patterns. People who run stop signs, 
people who are weaving in their lane or even outside their 
lane. Those are the types of things that certainly are, first 
of all, traffic violations and would give an officer a reason 
to stop; but those are the sort of driving patterns that are 
much more indicative of someone who's impaired. 
During the two blocks that the officer followed 
him, he committed not a single traffic violation, nor did the 
officer observe any sort of an equipment violation. So I think 
under a totality of the circumstances, the officer was simply 
stretching to try to make a stop; and he stretched it too far, 
based on the facts that he knew. Therefore there wasn't 
reasonable suspicion, and any of the evidence he seized after 
the stop was illegally obtained. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. We'll be in recess for 
about five, maybe ten minutes. I'll be back with the decision. 
(Recess taken) 
THE COURT: We're back on the record with Salt Lake 
City vs. Tim Bench. I've went in and went over your arguments; 
and I realize that totality of the circumstances is kind of a 
catchall for a lot of this — please be seated — but in my 
mind there's clearly not enough evidence to stop — to pull 
Mr. Bench over based on his driving pattern. 
I mean, if it's not illegal, I mean, if you allow 
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1 this, then where do you stop pulling anybody over for anything? 
2 You're driving too legally, you know. I mean, absent some 
3 violation or some impairment -- I know that can be frustrating. 
4 I was behind a person driving 30 in a 35 today. I was a little 
5 irritated because I wanted to go 35 and I had somewhere to get 
6 to, but it's not illegal otherwise. 
7 So then there's the question of does the dispatch 
8 call make a difference? Does that broaden the umbrella? I 
9 think it does somewhat, but certainly not enough in this case. 
10 Therefore I'm granting the defendant's motion to suppress the 
11 stop. Find that there's not probable cause — sufficient 
12 probable cause to pull him over to make the traffic stop. 
13 So will you prepare the necessary findings and order 
14 on that. 
15 MR. SCHATZ: I will, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Then, given that, does the City know 
17 what it wants to do? 
18 MS. GOMEZ: Well, your Honor, I think we'd like to 
19 appeal, but I don't know what our appeal rights are. So I'll 
20 check into that. 
21 THE COURT: Well, okay, I can set it — I mean, just so 
22 that we don't lose track of it, I can set it on Judge — that's 
23 the problem, though. I don't know the answer to this; maybe 
24 you can help me. 
25 I do know that on certain cases, felony cases, you 
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1 have to have the Judge that has the file, you have to have — 
2 precedence. If Judge Barrett were to hold a procedural rule on 
3 a procedural motion and then the case got shifted, I'd have to 
4 hear that again on a felony. I don't know if that's true on 
5 misdemeanors. Do either of you have any — 
6 MR. GOMEZ: I don't, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Because this is shifting — 
8 MR. SCHATZ: I don't, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: — this is shifting to Judge Fuchs as of 
10 July 1. So if there's an appeal, what I'm going to do is send 
11 it to Judge Fuchs on July 11th at 8:30. If for some reason it 
12 needs to come back for special attention from me at some point, 
13 I'm happy to take it back, but — 
14 MR. SCHATZ: That was July 11th at what time, your 
15 Honor? 
16 THE COURT: At 8:30. That's his next pretrial. Maybe 
17 the City will know by that time what it wants to do or will 
18 have done. 
19 MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, I know that Mr. Bench 
20 obviously has to work. Since it's mainly going to be a 
21 decision for the City to decide how they wish to proceed, 
22 would the Court be willing to excuse his attendance at that 
23 hearing? 
24 THE COURT: I don't mind. Does the City have a problem 
25 with that? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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What was that date, your Honor? 
July 11th; and it's whether or not — 
: If he doesn't appear, since we're not 
anything — 
GOMEZ: 
COURT: 
SCHATZ 
COURT: 
No. That's fine, your Honor. 
Okay, that's fine. 
: Thank you, Judge. 
Mr. Schatz, as you prepare this, there's 
little in the dispatch to broaden that umbrella, is 
saying, in 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
that ca. 
informat 
time 
justify 
THE 
ion . 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
the 
MR. 
SCHATZ 
COURT: 
SCHATZ 
COURT: 
SCHATZ 
the dispatch call. 
: So in essence you're saying that the — 
The breadth — 
: — the lack of detail and description — 
Right. 
: — about why she believed he was impaired, 
LI lacking in — 
COURT: Sure. I mean, there's just not enough 
in the dispatch to the officer. 
SCHATZ 
COURT: 
SCHATZ 
COURT: 
stop. 
SCHATZ 
: So in other words, the information — 
Right. 
: — the officer had knowledge of at the 
Coupled with the driving was not enough to 
: Okay. I'll try to be detailed with that. 
-2 9-
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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